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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2007 Term
by RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT WORTHINGTON,** ELISABETH
LILJENQUIST,** ADAM POMEROY,**** AND AMY POMEROY****
Introduction
This Study, the twenty-second in a series," tabulates and analyzes
the voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the
2007 Term.2 The analysis is designed to measure whether individual
Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms.
As in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. On such a point, members of the
American Constitution Society for Law and Politics and the
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies might well
disagree.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
* Managing Director, The Doha International Institute for Family Studies and
Development, Doha, Qatar, and Robert W. Barker Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark
Law School (On Leave).
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
*** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2009.
**** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2010.
*****' J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2010.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
Study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior. 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 Study]. The last thirteen Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2005 Terms, have
been published in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. For more detail, see endnote.
2. The 2007 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from
October 2007 through July 2008.
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claim of individual liberty By tracking the Term-to-Term
conservative or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual
Justices and the Court as a whole across these ten categories,' and by
applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,' this Study
attempts to provide reliable information regarding the current
ideological posture of the Court and its members, as well as
conclusions and projections regarding its past and future trends.
Whether statistical analysis of a complex and subjective process (such
as judicial decision-making) provides useful information may well be
debatable.6 But within the limitations inherent in an attempt to
"number crunch" ideology, this annual survey offers students and
practitioners information that is useful for assessing how the Court or
an individual Justice has voted-and may vote in the future-in
particular categories of cases.
II. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the
categories are based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First
Amendment and Equal Protection) or on the character of the parties
involved (i.e., state or federal government litigants).7 The tenth
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987)
(discussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions,
however, are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that
conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent change[s], respect for established
institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory
as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth
century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of pluralism; certain of
a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain of a desire to restrict
government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ROBERT V. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (5th ed. 1994); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (2d ed. 1990). The Court's method of selecting
cases is far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process.
Furthermore, reliable statistics generally require large quantities of information to
produce reliable results. As sample sizes become larger, inferences become more
accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not random
and because it is comparatively small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may not
accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
7. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
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category tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the
majority in cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's
attitude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court
decisions: the protection of individual rights and judicial restraint.
The tabulation of votes in these nine categories reveals, in broad
strokes, the frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as
a whole vote to protect individual rights8 or to exercise judicial
restraint.9
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking conservative or
liberal positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an
assertion of government power as "conservative" and outcomes that
favor a claim of individual rights as "liberal." Accordingly, the Study
classifies as conservative a vote for the government against an
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights,
a vote against the exercise of federal jurisdiction or a vote favoring
which the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, religion and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7)
statutory civil rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing,
justiciability and related matters; and (9) federalism cases. For more complete definitions
of the boundaries of these categories, see infra Appendix A.
8. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome
of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables 1
and 2 also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons
asserting private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously
relevant to individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and
state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to
deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights, and thus
is counted as a conservative vote.
9. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the
Justices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of
judicial restraint. Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some
indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial
restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to
the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of
constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 1-7) may provide some indication of "judicial activism"
because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn
precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant
because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states
within the federal system.
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state (as opposed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The
Study classifies all other votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions,
which constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the
Court, are included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or
conservative ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such
cases.0 Unanimous opinions often result when either the law or the
facts, or both, point so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a
decisional factor.11 Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not
always, or even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial
restraint."
Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and
judicial restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-
appears sound.13 For example, deference to legislatures frequently
results in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated
upon the impropriety of governmental action.14 Judicial restraint is
10. Unanimous cases may comprise a significant portion of the cases tabulated on the
various tables. This Term, for example, four of twelve cases were decided unanimously on
Table 1, four of ten cases were decided unanimously on Table 2, three of thirteen cases
were decided unanimously on Table 3; six of seventeen cases were decided unanimously
on Table 4; one of five cases was decided unanimously on Table 5; one of seven cases was
decided unanimously on Table 7; seven of fourteen cases were decided unanimously on
Table 8; two of fifteen cases was decided unanimously on Table 9.
11. An example of what seems to be a fairly non-controversial case for the court was
Arave v. Hoffman, No. 07-110 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2008) (per curiam) (case was only two pages
long and decided by a per curiam-or unsigned-opinion).
12. For example, Justice Scalia voted against the federal government on four of the
eight cases tabulated on Table 4 (Federal/Criminal Cases) this Term. These votes result in
a voting record that is less "liberal" than anticipated. However, Justice Scalia's "concern
for individual rights" on Table 4 this year does not necessarily suggest that he has
abandoned any commitment to "judicial restraint." Some of Justice Scalia's votes on
Table 4 reflect his preference for giving statutory language its "plain" or "ordinary"
meaning. See, e.g., James v. United States, 551 U.S. 192, 214 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
While "plain meaning" resulted in a "liberal" voting pattern on Table 4, Justice Scalia's
enthusiasm for "plain meaning" may well flow from (rather than run contrary to) his
conservative values. See, e.g., supra note 3 (noting that conservatism "implies fear of
sudden and violent change[s], respect for established institutions and rulers, support for
elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical
deductions").
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
14. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, No. 06-219 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (holding that a ranch
owner did not have a private right of action under the Fourth Amendment against
employees of the Bureau of Land Management who allegedly tried to extort from him an
easement for governmental use).
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associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution
or statutes. 5 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter
to the state courts with their possible bias in favor of state
governmental action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking
federal protection of rights. 6 Therefore, to the extent that the Study's
basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative
outcomes are sound, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the
voting patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.17
To determine current ideological positions within the Court,
votes of the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by
other Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1986-
2006 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court
as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes of the
Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this
information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the voting trends revealed over the years in the outcomes of
Majority, Split and Unanimous cases on each Table.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the
voting patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables
is to determine whether a Justice's 2007 Term voting record departs
in a statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting
pattern and whether any significant correlation exists among the
Term-to-Term voting patterns of the Justices. 8
The Study also calculates an anticipated 2007 Term voting score
for each Justice on the various Tables. This statistic is calculated with
an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average ("ARIMA")
forecasting model. 9 The ARIMA model is useful in situations where,
as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (per curiam) (holding that district
court lacked jurisdiction to consider habeas petition because prisoner did not obtain
permission from the Court of Appeals to file successive petition).
17. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The Study's general
assumption that votes favoring individual rights reflect liberal views is almost certainly not
accurate in every case. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
No. 05-908 (U.S. June 28, 2007) (the typical conservative majority voted against the
government and in favor of an Equal Protection claim that the use of racial classifications
to maintain racial balance within individual schools was unconstitutional). In this case, the
typically conservative Justices gain a "liberal" vote, even though some might assert that
their votes reflect a "conservative" value. See supra note 12.
18. See infra.
19. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
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based only on its present and prior values with no other explanatory
variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the
conservative and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor
analysis. This analysis tests the extent to which the Justices'
disposition of the cases on each of the first nine Tables may have
been influenced by liberal/conservative bias. Factor analysis has been
used in various empirical studies of human behavior, including
psychological inquiries into such personal traits as personality and
intelligence.20 The results of the factor analysis for the 2007 Term
appear in Part V of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually decided in a given Term
rather than against an absolute scale.21
All of the data and statistics reported in this Study must be
interpreted with caution. The percentages and statistical results
revealed in each table are affected not only by the dispositions of the
individual Justices but also by the nature of the cases decided each
Term. Furthermore, Supreme Court cases are not the result of
random selection and the universe of votes cast by the Justices is
relatively small. Since both random sampling and large sample size
are crucial elements of any fully reliable statistical analysis,
conclusions drawn from this Study are hardly beyond dispute. There
are obvious limitations to any empirical analysis of a subjective
decision-making process.22
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological
leanings of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the
Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of
attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars, and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable, even though such
20. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
21. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
22. See supra note 6.
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assessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of
the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved. This Study,
based upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering,
quantifying, and analyzing data over time, should be substantially
more reliable than these ad hoc assessments.
II. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2006 Term
The data collected on Tables 1-10 this Term tend to show fairly
consistent liberal movement-with Tables 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10 showing
various liberal voting patterns. The liberal movement on Tables 1
and 4 provide a strong assurance of liberal movement as factor
analysis ranks those tables as the second and third most reliable
indicators of bias. Table 2 falls in the middle of the pack when it
comes to reliability, but showed a liberal movement in Split,
Unanimous, and Majority cases. Tables 7 and 8 were the least
reliable indicators of bias this Term; Table 7 had a typically small
sample size (there were only six statutory civil rights cases), and Table
8, while it logged fifteen cases, included several classic pole-switching
cases, where the Court exercised jurisdiction (a "liberal" result) to
rule conservatively on the merits.3 Table 10 marked a distinctly
liberal trend, with the swing vote coming out liberal about 26.7 points
more often than last Term. Swing votes tabulated on Table 10 often
demonstrate how the Court feels about some of the more hot-ticket
issues and, accordingly, may well reveal significant indicia of
ideological bias.
The liberal trend on the Court seems reasonably clear, with only
two Tables showing noteworthy conservative movement (e.g., the
conservative outcome of Majority and Split decisions on state
criminal cases on Table 3 and the conservative movement regarding
federalism cases on Table 9). It should be noted that Table 3 is the
most reliable indication of bias this Term, so the conservative trend
on that table is significant. The limited amount of data collected on
Tables 5 and 6 (First Amendment and Equal Protection Claims) and
the volatile voting patterns demonstrated on those Tables make it
difficult to gauge whether they demonstrate either conservative or
liberal voting behavior.
In addition to the substantial liberal trend, the Tables also show
continuing ideological polarization on the Court. Factor analysis
highlights Tables 1 and 3, continuing from last Term, as the most
23. See infra Data Tables 7, 8.
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reliable indicators of potential ideological bias during the 2007 Term.
Those Tables, however, shake up the classic five/four conservative/
liberal divide on the Court. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer cast the
majority of their votes with the government on Table 1-the second
most reliable indicator of bias this Term-falling in with the most
conservative Justices on civil state cases. By contrast, Table 3, this
Term's most reliable indicator of bias, displayed the characteristic
ideological split, with Justices Scalia, Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, and
Thomas voting conservatively and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter,
and Ginsburg holding the liberal slots. Nevertheless, despite Table
3's conservative trend, the significant liberal movement on the other
tabulations suggests that, viewed as a whole, the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court were rather more liberal in the 2007
Term than in 2006.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases-State Government Versus a Private Party
In 2007 the Court showed a pronounced liberal movement in
civil state cases, bouncing back from a slight conservative leaning in
2006. The Court voted more liberally in the outcome of Majority
cases, voting for the government only 58% of the time, down from
68.4% in 2006, and significantly more liberally in Unanimous cases,
voting for the government only 25% of the time, nearly fifty points
less than it did in 2006. The Court showed a conservative voting
movement with the Split cases, voting for the government 75 % of the
time. Table 1 has demonstrated volatile movement over the past few
years, swinging from conservative to liberal to conservative patterns
and now back to liberal. Accordingly, the data on Table 1 must be
used with caution.
Continuing a fairly consistent pattern since 1999 regarding civil
state cases, the Court sided with the government more than fifty
percent of the time, but on the whole, voted 7.5 points more liberally
than we predicted. Historically, the Court has decided the great
majority of civil cases in favor of state governments; but our 2006
Study did not anticipate the interesting movement on Table 1
regarding the voting behavior of the individual Justices. Seven of the
nine Justices demonstrated statistically significant changes in voting
behavior; only Justices Souter and Stevens voted within ten points of
our predictions. Moreover with the Court moving an astonishing
forty-eight points more liberally in the Unanimous cases, the
individual Justices, not surprisingly, voted somewhat atypically. Chief
Justice Roberts voted more liberally and Justice Ginsburg slightly
more conservatively, falling into the most conservative four Justices.
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Justice Breyer also voted more conservatively while Justice Alito
appeared somewhere near the middle. Justices Kennedy, Stevens,
and Souter held the most liberal positions.
Finally, factor analysis for 2007 again demonstrates that Table 1
is the second most reliable indicator of bias. Based on this statistic,
and past civil state outcomes, we expect that Chart 1 will continue to
demonstrate rather reliably the individual Justices' ideological
tendencies as well as the Court's as a whole.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government Versus a Private Party
The Court showed liberal movement in Majority, Split, and
Unanimous cases. Only fifty percent of cases were decided in favor of
the federal government, whose win rate has not been so low since
2000. This across-the-board movement, however, may well be more
the result of case selection (and such factors as pole switching) than
bias.24 Furthermore, this year's liberal movement is not necessarily
indicative of a change in the direction of the Court since, according to
factor analysis, civil federal cases this Term were not reliable
indicators of bias.
The five most liberal Justices this Term were also the only
Justices to demonstrate statistically significant changes in voting
behavior and did so in a liberal direction. Only the scores of Justices
Scalia, Souter and Breyer were close to their predicted values.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases-State Government Versus a Private
Party
This Term there was clear conservative movement in Majority,
Split, and Unanimous cases. Unanimous cases were particularly
striking, reaching unprecedented conservative heights, though the
significance of this is somewhat tempered by the fact that there were
only three Unanimous cases. However, since factor analysis indicates
that Table 3 provides the most reliable evidence of conservative or
liberal bias this Term, this across-the-board conservative trend could
be significant.
All of the Justices who have been on the Court long enough for
analysis to be possible, with the exception of Justice Thomas,
demonstrated statistically significant conservative changes in voting
24. See Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. June 26, 2008) (In a classic pole switch, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy reached a liberal
outcome by declaring sections 319(a)-(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
unconstitutional.).
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behavior, with each voting more conservatively than predicted.
Justice Ginsburg occupied the most liberal position this year, a place
that has been occupied by Justice Stevens for four consecutive years.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases-Federal Government Versus a Private
Party
Recovering from the 2006 Term, in which the Justices decided
only three criminal Federal cases, the Court decided a substantial
number of these cases during the 2007 Term. While this return to
taking a significant number of cases in the category surely boosts the
reliability of the category, last Term's dearth of cases does make any
movement in this category corresponding less reliable. Most of the
movement can be seen as a recovery.
Consequently, although the movement for the Majority and Split
cases is clearly liberal and movement for Unanimous cases is clearly
conservative, given last Term's small number of cases, 25 Table 4 does
not reveal much about the ideological movement of the Court in
federal criminal cases compared to the previous year. On the other
hand, the movement does tend to show conformity with voting
behavior during the 2004 and 2005 Terms. Considering, however,
that both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito served their first full
Terms in 2005-2006, only future years will show the ideological
movement of the Court as a whole.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association and
Religion
Table 5 remains volatile and a poor indicator of bias largely
because of the small number of issues in this category-only five
issues were tabulated in this category this Term. Only one other
voting category, Equal Protection, had a smaller data set this Term.
Table 5 has demonstrated highly volatile voting patterns over the
past nine Terms, with no coherent trend (either conservative or
liberal) evident in the tabulated data. Perhaps the most important
inference that can be drawn from the data on Table 5 is that the
Court-over the course of nearly a decade-has been unable to
articulate a coherent and consistent approach to the First
Amendment issues it has addressed.
25. During the 2006 Term, the Court released seventy-five slip opinions, of which
sixty-two were included in last Term's universe of cases. See 2006 Study, infra endnote 1.
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Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
The Court-as it has for the last two Terms-decided only one
Equal Protection claim in 2007. A low number of cases on Table 6 is
typical of the Equal Protection category.26 Unsurprisingly, factor
analysis indicates that Table 6 is not a reliable indication of
ideological bias. 27 However, unlike last Term, the Court voted
against the claim, a conservative shift.'
Regression Table 6 shows close correlation between several sets
of Justices (Kennedy/Alito, Thomas/Scalia, and Ginsburg/Souter).29
However, because this category has such a small universe of cases and
an accordingly small possibility of divergent voting patterns,
correlation between different Justice's voting patterns may well be
unremarkable.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
The Court on Table 7 has shifted liberally this Term, voting in
favor of 83.3% of Statutory Civil Rights Claims, up from last Term's
66.7%.30  The Majority and Split cases also tended liberal, with
another thirty-point liberal movement in the outcome of Split
decisions. The Unanimous cases demonstrated the same liberal
trend, keeping in mind that there was only one Unanimous case. All
Members of the Court but Justices Thomas and Scalia demonstrated
statistically significant voting behavior, with Justice Alito showing
uncharacteristic liberal behavior, voting for the claim six out of seven
times. As a result of this voting pattern, Justice Alito holds one of the
four most liberal places on Table 7. Justices Souter and Ginsburg
(.94) and Justices Breyer and Stevens (.91) showed high voting
correlations. Nevertheless, factor analysis ranks Table 7 as the least
reliable indicator of ideological bias this Term.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
The Court demonstrated pronounced liberal movement on Table
8 during the 2007 Term in the outcome of Majority and Unanimous
26. See prior studies, infra endnote 1.
27. See infra Section V.
28. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., No. 07-474 (U.S. June 9, 2008).
29. See infra Regression Table 6.
30. See infra Data Table 7.
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cases, moving from 56% to 73.3% and 50% to 85.7%, respectively.
The Split cases also moved slightly liberally from 60% to 62.5%.
The 2007 Term was no exception to the Court's classically liberal
stance on jurisdiction. Table 8 demonstrates that since 1999 the
Court has rather consistently decided more than fifty percent of all
cases (Majority, Split and Unanimous) in favor of an assertion of
federal jurisdiction. This high predictability results in fairly accurate
predictions of the voting behaviors of individual Justices; this Term
every Justice voted within twenty points of his or her anticipated
score. All but Justice Thomas demonstrated statistically significant
voting behavior. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens and Ginsburg and
Souter had voting correlations of .91.
Factor analysis suggests that Table 8 is the second least reliable
Table at demonstrating ideological bias. This is due, at least partially,
to the Court's approach to jurisdictional issues. Both liberal and
conservative Justices, it appears, may be willing to stretch established
jurisdictional rules in order to reach a favored outcome on the merits.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases
Table 9 is again the fourth most reliable indicator of bias this
Term and, building from its slight conservative movement of last
Term, the Court's voting has moved in a notably conservative
direction-marking a clear departure from the 2005 Term's clear
liberal trend. In Majority and Split cases, the Court voted much more
conservatively than last Term; one hundred percent of the
Unanimous cases came out for the state, a clear departure from 2005
and 2006 when all of them came out against the state. This
conservative movement is significant because state governments are
winning substantially more than half the time, something not seen for
the last five years.
Only four of the nine Justices demonstrated statistically
significant voting behavior on Table 9 (Thomas, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Breyer). Interestingly, two of the most traditionally liberal
Justices on the Court seemed to favor state claims more often than
usual. In the 2007 Term, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg both voted
with the state at least fifty percent of the time.31
31. See infra Mean Table 9.
[Vol. 37:2
Winter 2010] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2007 TERM 299
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
For yet another Term, Justice Kennedy's influence over the
direction of the Court is nowhere more evident than on Table 10,
which he controlled by casting two-thirds of his votes with the
majority in closely divided cases. In other words, he voted with the
majority in two out of every three split decisions. Unlike last Term,
however, where no Justice could even begin to approach his one
hundred percent streak for voting with the majority, Justice Kennedy
was not alone in the top position. Justice Thomas also voted with the
majority in two out of every three split decisions. Considering Justice
Thomas's reputation for being a very conservative Justice, it is
fascinating to see that there was a clear liberal movement this Term
with sixty percent of cases coming out liberally and forty percent
coming out conservative-the exact opposite of last Term. Despite
this liberal movement, there has been a generally conservative tenor
on this Table to varying degree since 1999.32 This conservative tenor
can be expected to continue because, even with the liberal movement
this Term, the conservative Justices continue to vote with the majority
in close cases more often than the liberal Justices.
32. Id.
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IV. Analysis33
Table 1: Civil-State Party34
Data Table 1 this Term demonstrates the effects of the Court's
decisions in areas such as gun control35 and political party procedure. 6
For the sixth year in a row, Data Table 1 provides the second most
33. Throughout Section IV, a footnote will list the cases tabulated on Tables 1-10.
An asterisk (C*-) preceding a case citation indicates that it appears more than once on
Tables 1-9. All cases on Table 10 appeared at least once on Tables 1-9. A "slashed Y"
(,,V) preceding a case citation indicates that more than one voting pattern was tabulated
for the case. See Appendix A ("A case is included more than once on the same table if it
raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are
resolved by different voting alignments."). When more than one voting pattern is
tabulated for a case, a number followed by an "x" will follow the case citation. For
example, "(2x)" means that two voting patterns were tabulated for the case. Because
more than one voting pattern may be tabulated, some cases reflect both "liberal" and
"conservative" outcomes on different issues. Not every case decided by the Court is
included on Tables 1-10. If a case does not involve the federal or state government, or has
governmental entities on both sides, it may not be included on Tables 1-4. See Appendix
A (definitions). Cases are included on Tables 5-9 only when they involve questions
involving the subject matter of those Tables (First Amendment, Equal Protection,
Statutory Civil Rights, Jurisdiction and Federalism questions). Id. Table 10 tabulates the
outcome of all cases decided by a single vote. Id. As a result of this classification scheme,
not every Supreme Court opinion is included in this Study. For 2007, the following cases
did not fall within the Study's established parameters: Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. Of N.Y.
v. Tom F., No. 06-637 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2007) (per curiam); Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v.
Mendelsohn, No. 06-1221 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2008); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, No. 06-1498
(U.S. Mar. 3, 2008) (per curiam); New Jersey v. Delaware, No. 134, Orig. (U.S. Mar. 31,
2008); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 06-937 (U.S. June 9, 2008);
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., No. 07-210 (U.S. June 9, 2008); Allison Engine
Co. v. U.S. ex rel Sanders, No. 07-210 (U.S. June 9, 2008); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
No. 07-219 (U.S. June 25,2008).
34. *CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 08-1034 (U.S. Dec. 4,
2007); *N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, No. 06-766 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2008); *Rowe v.
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n., No. 06-457 (U.S. Feb. 20,2008); *Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
St'ate Republican Party, No. 06-1498 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008); MeadWestvaco Corp. v. I11.
Dep't of Revenue, No. 06-1413 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2008); *Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., No. 07-21 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2008); *Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, No. 06-
666 (U.S. May 19, 2008); *Riley v. Kennedy, 128 No. 07-77 (U.S. May 27, 2008); *Engquist
v. Or. Dep't of Ag., No. 07-474 (U.S. June 9, 2008); *Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly
Cafeterias, Inc., No. 07-312 (U.S. June 16, 2008); *Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, No.
06-552 (U.S. June 19, 2008); District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. June 26, 2008).
35. See Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. June 26, 2008). This case was a classic pole switch,
with the conservative Justices voting liberally against the state in favor of the Second
Amendment's right to bear arms-a constitutional clause that conservatives love and
liberals detest.
36. See Torres, No. 06-766 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2008); Wash. State Grange, No. 06-1498 (U.S.
Mar. 3, 2008); Crawford, No. 07-21 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2008).
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reliable evidence of ideological bias on the Court37with the Court
moving in a markedly liberal direction. The Court voted 10.1 points
more liberally than in 2006 in the outcome of Majority cases, 8.3
points more conservatively in Split cases, and 46.4 points more
liberally in Unanimous cases.38
The interesting and atypical outcomes on Table 1 are evidenced
by the discrepancy in our predicted and actual voting behaviors for
the 2007 Term.39 The voting behaviors of only two Justices (Souter
and Stevens) were within ten points of their anticipated scores, with
Justice Ginsburg voting within seventeen points, Justice Breyer
eleven points, and Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Scalia more than
twenty points. We did not anticipate scores for the Co4rt's two
newest Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.4°Although
unanimous outcomes are less likely to indicate bias, these cases
demonstrated significant liberal deviation from last Term's more
conservative results.
Pronounced individual liberal movement by typically
conservative Justices with only slight conservative movement among
the more liberal Justices naturally resulted in a more liberal outcome
with regard to other statistical measures. As for positioning, the
Justices seemed to move toward each other. Justices Roberts (58.3),
Thomas (58.3), Ginsburg (58.3), and Breyer (58.3) were most
conservative; followed by Justices Scalia (50.0), Alito (50.0) and
Stevens (41.7); and Kennedy (41.7) and Souter (41.7) voting most
liberally. The analysis does not suggest that the Justices voted in any
identifiable dyads on Table 1, which is to be expected based on the
dramatic liberal trend.
37. See 2006 Study, infra endnote 1, at 546 (indicating that year was the fourth in a row).
38. It should be kept in mind that there were only four unanimous cases on Data Table 1.
39. See supra Data Table 1.
40. For more information about the vagaries of ARIMA forecasting, see infra note 115.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Data Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government versus a Private Party4'
The Court showed significant liberal movement across Majority,
Split, and Unanimous cases; in all three categories the Court moved
in a liberal direction by at least twenty-five points. However, this
across-the-board movement is probably more indicative of the cases
than bias.42 Furthermore, this year's liberal movement is tempered by
the fact that, according to factor analysis, civil federal cases were not
very indicative of bias.43
The five most liberal Justices this Term (Kennedy, Stevens,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter) were the only Justices to demonstrate
statistically significant changes in voting behavior and did so in a
liberal direction. Only the scores of Justices Scalia, Souter, and
Breyer were close to the predicted values: Justice Scalia's predicted
score was within 1.2 points of his actual score, Justice Souter's
predicted score was within 7.7 points of his actual scores, and Justice
Breyer's predicted score was within .8 points of his actual score.
Last Term, the federal government won 76.5% of cases brought
before the Court, following the general rule that the federal
government wins Supreme -Court cases." However, despite our
prediction that the federal government would win over two-thirds of
cases this Term," the government won only fifty percent of cases.
While this voting behavior is not unprecedented,46 it is a deviation
from the trend established in the 2001-2006 Terms in which the
federal government won between 75 and 81.8% of the time (2005
41. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-9130 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007); John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, No. 06-1164 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2008); Knight v. Comm'r, No. 06-
1286 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2008); *Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, No. 06-1322 (U.S. Feb. 27,
2008); United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., No. 07-308 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2008);
*Gomez-Perez v. Potter, No. 06-1321 (U.S. May 27, 2008); *Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Chertoff, No. 06-1717 (U.S. June 2, 2008); *Taylor v. Sturgell, No. 07-371 (U.S. June 12,
2008); *Dada v. Mukasey, No. 06-1181 (U.S. June 16, 2008); *Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320
(U.S. June 26, 2008).
42. See FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. June 26, 2008). (In a classic pole switch, Roberts,
Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy reached a liberal outcome by declaring sections
319(a)-(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 unconstitutional.).
43. See infra Factor Analysis (Data Table 2-Civil cases involving the Federal
Government as party-ranked fifth this year for reliability with a score of .295,
significantly lower than fourth place Data Table 9's score of .594).
44. For a good example of this sort of case, see Clintwood, No. 07-308 (U.S. Apr. 15,
2008) (unanimously upholding the government's position that a citizen must file a timely
administrative refund claim before bringing suit against the government).
45. See 2006 Study, infra endnote 1, Table 2.
46. During the 1998-2000 Terms, the government won only about fifty percent of
cases. See 1999 Study; 2000 Study; 2001 Study infra endnote 1.
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excepted). Despite this Term's low score, it is still anticipated that
the federal government will win over two-thirds of the cases next
Term.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases-State Government versus a Private Party
47
There is clear conservative movement in Majority, Split, and
Unanimous criminal-state cases. While Majority and Split cases
reached similar levels in 2003 and 2005, Unanimous cases have never
before reached such conservative heights, though the significance of
this unprecedented level is somewhat tempered by the fact that there
were only three Unanimous cases. However, because factor analysis
indicates that Table 3 provides the most reliable evidence of
conservative or liberal bias this Term, this across-the-board
conservative trend is particularly significant. 8
All of the Justices who have been on the Court long enough for
analysis to be possible, with the exception of Justice Thomas, voted
more conservatively than anticipated. With the exception of Justices
Thomas and Roberts, each Justice exhibited statistically significant
conservative shifts in voting behavior.
The traditional conservative/liberal blocs (with the Chief Justice
and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Kennedy forming the conservative five-
member majority) are displayed on the Table. Justice Ginsburg
occupies the most liberal position this year, a place that has been
occupied by Justice Stevens for four consecutive years. Justice Alito
was the most conservative Justice for the second year in a row, edging
out Justices Scalia and Thomas who typically occupy this position.
47. Allen v. Siebert, No. 06-1680 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2007) (per curiam); *Arave v.
Hoffman, No. 07-110 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2008) (per curiam); Wright v. Van Patten, No. 07-212
(U.S. Jan. 7, 2008) (per curiam); Danforth v. Minnesota, No. 06-8273 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008);
*Snyder v. Louisiana, No. 06-10119 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2008); Medellin v. Texas, No. 06-984
(U.S. Mar. 25, 2008); *Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008); Virginia. v. Moore,
No. 06-1082 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2008); Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208 (U.S. June 19, 2008);
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, No. 07-440 (U.S. June 23, 2008); Giles v. California, No. 07-
6053 (U.S. June 25, 2008); Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. June 25, 2008).
48. See infra Factor Analysis (Data Table 3 - Criminal cases involving a State
Government as party).
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Data Table 4: Criminal Cases-Federal Government versus a Private
Party
49
After an unusual year in which the 2006 Court took only three
criminal federal cases, the 2007 Court again took a significant number
of federal criminal cases. More importantly, Table 4 yet again
maintained its position as the third most reliable indicator of bias for
the Term.
Table 4 shows significant movement for Majority, Split, and
Unanimous decisions. The Majority and Split decisions moved
significantly in the liberal direction while Unanimous decisions
moved in a significantly conservative direction. Such movement,
however, is deceptive. Not only did the 2006 Court hear only three
cases in this category, but the Unanimous decisions were a null set in
2006."0 Thus, when compared to the years immediately preceding
2006 it is apparent that the liberal movement in the Majority and Split
decisions for 2007, while significant, is not as dramatic as it might first
seem. The same logic applies to the conservative movement in the
Unanimous decisions with the additional caveat that Unanimous
cases are less indicative of bias than Split decisions.
Justices Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Souter were all
within ten points of their anticipated voting scores. Since Justices
Alito and Roberts have not yet been on the Court long enough to
obtain predictions, this means that only the predictions for Justices
Breyer and Stevens were outside an acceptable range. The error of
the whole was close and most patterns were statistically significant.
The only significant correlated voting behavior is between
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, signifying somewhat parallel voting
49. Logan v. United States, No. 06-6911 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2007); Gall v. United States,
No. 06-7949 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2007); Watson v United States, No. 06-571 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2007);
Kimbrough v. United States, No. 06-6330 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2007); Boulware v. United States,
No. 06-1509 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008); Burgess v. United States, No. 06-11429 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2008); Begay v. United States, No. 06-11543 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008); *Gonzalez v. United
States, No. 06-11612 (U.S. May 12, 2008); United States v. Ressam, No. 07-455 (U.S. May
19, 2008); *United States v. Williams, No. 06-694 (U.S. May 19, 2008); United States v.
Rodriquez, No. 06-1646 (U.S. May 19, 2008); United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005 (U.S.
June 2, 2008); Cuellar v. United States, No. 06-1456 (U.S. June 2, 2008); *Munaf v. Geren,
No. 06-1666 (U.S. June 12, 2008); Irizarry v. United States, No. 06-7517 (U.S. June 12,
2008); Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. June 12, 2008); Greenlaw v. United States,
No. 07-330 (U.S. June 23, 2008).
50. Additional deception comes from the fact that the null set for Unanimous
decisions appears on the graph as a zero. A more useful conceptualization of unanimous
data for 2006 would be to delete the point and imagine a dotted line (representing the null
set) connecting the 2005 and 2007 Terms. Such a line would demonstrate how the
movement from 2005 to 2006 and 2006 to 2007 is not as dramatic as it first appears.
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behavior by the Justices which is confirmed by the fact that they
voted the same way in all but one case this Term.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Cases-Rights of Expression,
Association, and Religion 
5
Table 5 remains volatile and a poor indicator of bias largely
because of the small number of cases on this table. This Term only
five First Amendment decisions were tabulated and last year there
were only four. Both doctrine and voting patterns remain chaotic
with only a single case garnering a Unanimous decision.
Keeping with the theme of chaos, the stereotypical voting blocs
are in disarray. Justice Scalia's score is as liberal as well as the scores
of Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, while Justice Stevens is
the only Justice with a perfect conservative score as he voted against
every First Amendment claim this Term. Despite this disarray,
predicted scores were fairly accurate: Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg voted within five points of their anticipated score, while all
other Justices with a sufficient voting record to make calculation
possible, with the exception of Justice Stevens, voted within about
fifteen points of their anticipated scores.
In addition to small sample size problems and incoherent
doctrine, the specter of pole-switching votes continues to make First
Amendment cases poor subjects for statistical analysis. For example
in Davis v. FEC,52 the Court addressed the constitutionality of an
election law which created asymmetric campaign finance restrictions
that worked to the detriment of self-financing candidates. One such
self-financing candidate asserted a First Amendment claim. In a
classic pole-switch vote, Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas voted in favor of the claim while Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer voted against the claim.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Cases53
The Court generally decides few, if any, 4 Equal Protection cases
each Term, so it is not surprising that Table 6 is one of the least
51. *N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, No. 06-766 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2008); *Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, No. 06-1498 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008);
*Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., No. 07-21 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2008); *Williams, No.
06-694 (U.S. May 19, 2008); *Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. June 26, 2008).
52. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. June 26, 2008).
53. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., No. 07-474 (U.S. June 9, 2008).
54. See, e.g., 2001 Study, infra endnote 1, at 316; see also 2003 Study, infra endnote 1, at 28.
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reliable indicators of ideological bias on the Court,5 as well as one of
the most volatile categories of cases analyzed by the Study. This
Term, like the last two, the Court decided only one Equal Protection
claim. But, unlike last Term, the 2007 Court ruled against the claim.
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, a public employee
asserted a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather than
alleging that her arbitrary treatment was based upon her membership
in a particular class, she based her claim on a "class-of-one" theory. 6
Holding that there is a crucial difference between the government
acting as a regulator and an employer, the Court refused to apply the
"class-of-one" theory in the public employment context.57
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
58
Factor analysis indicates that Table 7 is again the least reliable
indicator of bias this Term.59 The trend in the Majority cases is
liberal, up from 66.7% to 83.3% of votes going in favor of the claim.
The move in Split cases is significantly liberal, shifting another thirty
percentage points (the same as last Term) to eighty percent, and the
Unanimous cases moved liberally from seventy-five percent to one
hundred percent. Since Split cases are more indicative of bias, the
overall trend seems to be liberal. Nevertheless, because of the small
universe of cases, the movement on Table 7 should be taken with a
grain of salt.
Table 7 shows the typical ideological rankings quite nicely,
except for Justice Alito showing up in the most liberal four Justices.
Not surprisingly, Justice Kennedy holds the middle vote with Justices
Breyer, Roberts, Scalia and Thomas voting more conservatively,
respectively. Justices Ginsburg and Souter had the highest voting
correlation at .94; Justices Stevens and Breyer came in at .91. Our
predicted voting behavior was 26.8 points off the actual score for the
Court as a whole, and was fairly accurate for a number of the
individual Justices; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Scalia all
55. See supra Chart 6.
56. Engquist, No. 07-474 (U.S. June 9,2008).
57. Id. at 1-2.
58. *Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, No. 06-1322 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2008); * Riley v.
Kennedy, 128 No. 07-77 (U.S. May 27, 2008); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, No. 06-
1431 (U.S. May 27, 2008); *Gomez-Perez v. Potter, No. 06-1321 (U.S. May 27, 2008);
*Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, No. 06-1717 (U.S. June 2, 2008); Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Lab., No. 06-1505 (U.S. June 19, 2008); *Ky. Ret. Sys. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n., No. 06-1037 (U.S. June 19,2008).
59. See supra Chart 7.
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voted within ten points of our predictions. Justices Thomas, Breyer,
and Kennedy voted within thirteen to twenty points of our
predictions.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
60
Showing significant liberal movement, Table 8 demonstrates
continuation of the Court's long-term liberal tendency to reject
challenges to federal jurisdiction. This Term, the Court voted 73.3%
of the time in favor of the claim, up from 56% last Term. An
examination of past Table 8 outcomes suggests that the Court favors
federal jurisdiction more often than not and that the Court's liberal
stance is fairly stable. With the exception of 1999, when an unusually
high number of jurisdictional challenges were rejected, the outcomes
of Majority cases on Table 8 have fluctuated within a relatively
narrow range of 54.6% to 66.7% in the last decade and now have
jumped to 73.3%. 61  With such significant expansion of federal
jurisdiction, it is no wonder the Court utilized a wide range of
doctrines to delimit its power, including that of equitable discretion,62
and a much broader interpretation of standing. 63
Our voting predictions, were fairly accurate regarding Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Souter, but significantly off for Justices Stevens,
60. *Arave v. Hoffman, No. 07-110 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2008) (per curiam); Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43 (U.S. Jan 15, 2008); LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 06-856 (U.S. Feb 20, 2008); *Holowecki, No. 06-
1322 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2008); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 06-989 (U.S. Mar. 25,
2008); *Gonzalez v. United States, No. 06-11612 (U.S. May 12, 2008); *Riley v. Kennedy,
128 No. 07-77 (U.S. May 27, 2008); *Munaf v. Geren, No. 06-1666 (U.S. June 12, 2008);
Republic of the Phil. v. Pimentel, No. 06-1204 (U.S. June 12, 2008); *Taylor v. Sturgell,
No. 07-371 (U.S. June 12, 2008); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, No. 06-923 (June 19, 2008);
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., No. 07-552 (U.S. June 23, 2008); *Davis v.
FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. June 26, 2008)'. It bears noting that Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co. is a rather difficult case to categorize because it involved
sovereigns on both sides and may have been a conservative vote, thus skewing the liberal
trend had it been included. In this case, a 5-4 majority voted against Indian sovereignty.
No. 07-411 (U.S. June 25, 2008).
61. See supra Data Table 8.
62. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, No. 06-43 (U.S. Jan 15, 2008). Here the Court uses
classic equitable considerations to conclude that there is no implied right of action and if
there is, it must be provided by reversal. See LaRue, No. 06-856 (U.S. Feb 20, 2008). The
Court here implies a right of action ostensibly on the basis of plain language, but arguably
on the basis of equitable discretion as well.
63. See Sprint Commc'ns, No. 07-552 (U.S. June 23, 2008). The Court has never ruled
that an individual could create standing by private contract. This case marks a very broad
expansion of standing.
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Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy. For the Court as a whole, our
predictions came within 12.3 points of the Court's actual voting; the
Court voted more liberally, voting for the claim 73.3% of the time, up
from 56% last Term.
As in the 2006 Term, Data Table 8 remains the second-least
useful table at measuring ideological bias. This may be a result of
more pole-switching in the area of jurisdiction. The Justices are
sometimes willing to expand jurisdiction in order to favor their
preferred outcomes on the merits. One example this Term was
Munaf v. Geren,6' a case concerning the right of habeas corpus for
U.S. citizens held oversees by American forces. The Court
determined that U.S. courts had jurisdiction over habeas petitions
filed on behalf of such persons, a liberal move, but then declared the
district courts could not enjoin the United States from transferring
individuals charged with crimes in a foreign sovereign to that
sovereign for criminal prosecution on that basis alone. Further,
before granting a preliminary injunction to the transfer of the
individual from U.S. to foreign power, the district court must first
consider the merits of the petition. Thus, while the Court asserted
itself in the area of jurisdiction, characteristically a liberal move, it
chose to tread carefully in areas of international law, an arguably
conservative move on the merits.65 We continue to expect moderate-
to-liberal outcomes on Data Table 8.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases66
Table 9 is, again, the fourth most reliable indicator of bias this
Term.67  The trend on Majority and Split cases is markedly
conservative; Majority cases went from 30% to 60% and Split from
64. Munaf No. 06-1666 (U.S. June 12, 2008).
65. Id. at 5, 9-11.
66. *CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 08-1034 (U.S. Dec. 4,
2007); Danforth v. Minnesota, No. 06-8273 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
No. 06-179 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008); Preston v. Ferrer, No. 06-1463 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008); *Rowe
v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n., No. 06-457 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008); *Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, No. 06-1498 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008); *Snyder v. Louisiana, No.
06-10119 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2008); *Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008); *Crawford
v. Marion County Election Bd., No. 07-21 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2008); *Dep't of Revenue of Ky.
v. Davis, No. 06-666 (U.S. May 19, 2008); *Riley v. Kennedy, 128 No. 07-77 (U.S. May 27,
2008); *Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., No. 07-312 (U.S. June 16,
2008); *Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, No. 06-552 (U.S. June 19, 2008); *Ky. Ret. Sys.
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n., No. 06-1037 (U.S. June 19, 2008); Morgan
Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, No. 06-1457 (U.S. June 26, 2008).
67. See infra Part V.
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37.5% to 69.2%. Both Unanimous cases came out in favor of state
governments. This Term the Court favored the state considerably
more than in past years in which the state typically won less than half
of the time. Despite the Court's continuation of its conservative
trend from last Term, with such dramatic movement, our anticipated
score for the Court as a whole was about 29.3 points off.
Interestingly, Table 9 shows Justices Ginsburg and Breyer voting
more frequently in favor of the state than Justice Kennedy and even
Justice Alito. Justice Ginsburg tied with Justice Scalia with eight
votes for the state, almost reaching Justice Thomas, the most
conservative voter on Table 9, with ten votes.6' For another Term in a
row, Justice Souter is the most liberal Justice on this Table.6 9
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Analysis: Who Votes Most Often With the
Majority in Close Cases?70
Cases decided by a single vote (which most often involve 5-4
decisions, but also include other circumstances where a change in a
single vote would alter the outcome, such as a 5-3 vote to reverse) fall
into the "swing vote" category and generally provide reliable
evidence of ideological trends on the Court.7 Many previous editions
of this Study demonstrate that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
tended to be the leaders in casting the decisive vote in closely divided
cases.72  With the departure of Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy
moved squarely into the limelight. In the 2007 Term, Justice
Kennedy maintained his leadership by casting 66.7% of his votes with
68. See supra Data Table 9.
69. Id.
70. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-9130 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007); United States v.
Santos, No. 06-1005 (U.S. June 2, 2008); Irizarry v. United States, No. 06-7517 (U.S. June
12, 2008); Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. June 12, 2008); Dada v. Mukasey, No.
06-1181 (U.S. June 16, 2008); *Ky. Ret. Sys. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n.,
No. 06-1037 (U.S. June 19, 2008)'; Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., No. 07-552
(U.S. June 23, 2008)'; Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. June 25, 2008); District of
Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. June 26, 2008); * Davis v. FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S.
June 26, 2008).
71. See 2003 Study, infra endnote 1, at 36; 2002 Study, infra endnote 1, at 521.
72. See 2001 Study, infra endnote 1, at 318, 326, 331; 2000 Study, infra endnote 1, at
259; 1999 Study, infra endnote 1, at 605; 1998 Study, infra endnote 1, at 434, 489; 1997
Study, infra endnote 1, at 597. But see FEC, No. 07-320 (U.S. June 26, 2008) (a classic First
Amendment pole-switching issue-beloved by political conservatives, detested by liberals,
and scorned by researchers everywhere for pole-switching's distorting effect on voting
behavior patterns).
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the majority in close cases-in other words, Justice Kennedy decided
two out of every three split decisions during the 2007 Term.
Unlike last Term, however, Justice Kennedy was not alone in the
crowning position. Justice Thomas, far from a usual leader in the
category, tied Justice Kennedy this year for voting with the majority
in two out of every three cases. More pertinent, though, is the effect
their combined voting had on the Court's direction.
Very surprisingly, Justice Kennedy and Thomas's combined
influence moved the Court in a significantly liberal direction
compared to previous Terms. This Term's Swing votes were 61.5%
liberal, up from 40% last Term.73 Though this is a significant
movement and a recent high, one should not read too much into it.
The Swing Vote percentage has ranged within 10 points of 50%
conservative/liberal for the last decade, with only three exceptions.
And two of those times, including this time, were only 11.5 points of
the 50% mark. This Study predicts that Justice Kennedy will still
have considerable influence over the outcome of swing-vote cases for
the foreseeable future, but as to what those outcomes will likely be is
hard to say-Justice Kennedy is notoriously difficult to predict.
Another interesting aside is that though there was significant
liberal movement, conservative Justices clearly continue to have more
influence on the direction of the Court in closely divided cases than
the liberal Justices-two of the top three Justices are largely viewed
as conservative (Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts) and three
of the top five are so viewed (addition of Justice Scalia). Thus,
though there was significant liberal movement to a recent liberal high,
one can expect the category to float around the fifty percent line-
again, likely subject to the voting predilections of Justice Kennedy.
V. Factor Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the
effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and
conservative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some
categories turn out to be more reliable indicators of ideological
tendencies than others.
The reliability of the various tables in this Study can be
influenced by many factors, including the particular makeup of the
Court's caseload and small sample size. Equal protection cases in
73. Note that swing vote cases that are not otherwise within our universe of cases are
not tallied toward liberal/conservative outcomes, though they are counted toward a
Justice's percentage voting with the majority in Swing Vote cases. See infra Appendix A.
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Data Table 6, for example, tend to make up a small portion of the
Court's workload each Term74 and are consistently one of the least
reliable indicator of ideological bias.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate
between the voting patterns of more liberal and more conservative
Justices, we have applied a statistical tool known as factor analysis
." In applying this tool, we have determined that a primary
factor may be extracted from the Study's categories over the entire
life of the Study that accounts for more of the variance revealed by
the data on Tables 1 through 9 than any other factor. 6 We interpret
this "Factor 1" as liberal/conservative bias simply because that is what
this Study purports to measure. The categories currently load onto










Statutory Civil Rights -0.061
Variance 2.2894
% Variance 0.254
According to this ranking, Table 3 (Criminal/State Party), for the
third Term in a row, is the most reliable indicator of
liberal/conservative leanings over time. Tables 3, 1, 4, and 9 are
ranked in the same order of reliability as last Term, and remain the
most reliable indicators of ideological bias, while the remaining five
continue to be of questionable value in that regard.
74. 2003 Study, infra endnote 1, at 37.
75. 2002 Study, infra endnote 1, at 564.
76. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
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As we noted in the 2003 Study, 7 these results may seem
counterintuitive to those holding a stereotypical understanding of the
Court-that issues relating to the First Amendment, Statutory Civil
Rights, and Equal Protection would (seemingly) provide nearly
perfect opportunities for the Justices to show their ideological
leanings. However, as we have discussed in three prior studies,8 such
cases often involve "pole-switching," where Justices vote
"conservatively" (under the definitions of this Study) in order to
further a "liberal" policy preference, or vice versa.79
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Conservative Frontier
Liberal Frontier
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VI. Frontier Analysis
Quantifying the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or conservative
tendency, or bias, and identifying trends in these tendencies over time
is challenging. A variety of reasons create this challenge, such as
choosing appropriate tests and assessing their validity or dealing with
inconsistency in the nature of cases before the Court from Term to
Term. Despite such varied parameters, one useful method to
quantify, analyze, and compare the Justice's tendencies is frontier
analysis.8
Rather than focusing on the Justice's absolute scores for each
category, frontier analysis focuses on their relative scores.
Boundaries, or frontiers, are defined by the highest and lowest scores
in each category as well as each combination of categories. Each
Justice is then evaluated relative to the frontier created by this
method. By adjusting the relative weights allocated to each category,
the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each category's reliability
(which itself was determined by the factor analysis as described in
Part V, supra). Data for the Court is presented on both conservative
and liberal frontiers as well as on both constrained and unconstrained
versions of each frontier.
On Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2, for conservative and liberal
scoring respectively, the weights applied to each category are
constrained according to the factor analysis hierarchy discussion in
Section V. Weights are chosen for each Justice that produces the
highest possible frontier score for each table, once to appear the most
conservative possible and once the most liberal. However, these
weights are subject to the following limitation: Statutory Civil Rights
(the least reliable category) cannot receive more weight than
Jurisdiction (the second least reliable category), Jurisdiction cannot
receive more weight than Equal Protection (the third least reliable
category), and so on moving upward from the least reliable to the
most reliable category as set out in Section V.
By contrast, no weighting constraints are applied to Frontier
Analysis Tables 3 and 4. Instead, on these tables weights are chosen
that present each Justice in the most conservative or liberal light
possible without the constraint of category reliability.
These four Tables each lists a "% of Frontier" score for each
Justice. Those Justices with a score of 100% of the frontier reach the
frontier by employing the category weight distribution shown in the
80. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
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category columns (where the number shown represents the percent
weight given to that category). A score less than 100% indicates that
the most conservative/liberal score the Justice could obtain with
optimal weighting places him or her at the indicated percentage of the
way towards the frontier. In some cases, an optimal combination of
weights may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This condition is
known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the "% Super Efficient"
column of the charts when applicable.
Frontier Analysis Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores for
each Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices as they replace
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to the determination of the liberal and
conservative frontiers during Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Analysis Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of
constrained frontier scores during the course of this Study. They are
easier to read than the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the
Justice's relative positions and score ranges overall. They do not,
however, show any trend information.
According to Frontier Analysis Table 1, "Conservative
Frontier-Constrained," Justice Thomas was the most conservative
Justice in 2007.81 Four Justices were able to reach the conservative
frontier on this constrained Frontier Analysis Table,8 with three
Justices reaching superefficient scores ranging from 111% (Justice
Thomas) to 101% (Justice Scalia). Justice Kennedy, for the second
year in a row, fell short at 91%. Justice Souter (71%) maintained his
position as the least conservative Justices in the 2007 Term.83
Frontier Analysis Table 2, displaying the results from a
constrained calculation of the liberal frontier, shows two Justices were
able to meet the frontier, both with superefficient scores: Justices
Ginsburg (117%) and Souter (111%). 84 Justices Thomas and Alito
tied for being the least liberal Justice (63%) of the 2007 Term.85
The unconstrained Frontier Analysis Tables maximize the effects
of pole-switching and other potentially distorting voting behaviors
and, therefore, do not provide reliable evidence of conservative or
81. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
85. Id.; compare Study 2003, infra endnote 1, at Frontier Analysis Table 2.
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liberal bias. The real importance of the unconstrained Tables lies in
their illustration of the value of constrained analysis and the
importance of factor analysis.86
Unlike last Term, not every Justice was able to reach the
unconstrained frontiers on Tables 3 and 4. Justice Souter stands
alone in not reaching the conservative frontier while Justice Breyer,
Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts were each unable to reach
the liberal frontier. Last year, when every Justice was able to reach
both frontiers, the Study suggested that this might indicate that the
Court, as a whole, was not as divided as it had been in previous years.
The scatterplot charts show that during the 2007 Term the Justices
were not clustered as close together near the liberal and conservative
frontiers as during the 2006 Term, but they are still clustered much
more tightly than the Justices of some past Courts. This Study
previously noted that this result could be an aberration, the
fulfillment of Chief Justice Roberts's stated goal of acting with
consensus on the Court, or the result of some other factor. As of yet
it is still too soon to tell, but continued clustering in subsequent years
might make the Chief Justice smile if he passes to look back over this
Study.
Conclusion
The voting patterns tabulated by the 2007 Study reveal (as
should be expected) a somewhat unsettled Court. The areas most
indicative of bias diverged in opposite directions. Most surprising has
been the voting behavior of the more liberal Justices in a more
conservative bent. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer voted conservatively
in civil-state cases-an area that is the second most indicative of
ideological bias on the Court-an interesting result given the overall
trend of Table 1 and the Court was as a whole was liberal. On Table
2, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer voted toward the
conservative side of the liberal bloc. Table 3, the most indicative of
bias, there was a decidedly conservative leaning.
The ideological posture of the Court-considered as a whole-
may be difficult to reckon, but appears to lean liberally. Six Tables
demonstrated liberal movement (Tables 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10).
Interestingly, last Term, five of these tables (Tables 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10)
86. See 2003 Study, infra endnote 1, at 818 ("The unconstrained Frontier Tables
amplify the effects of pole-switching. Accordingly, the most reliable evidence of ideology
on these Tables comes from the constrained analysis.").
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showed conservative movement; Tables 1 and 4 have both been
highly indicative of bias last Term and this Term. It bears noting,
however, that Table 3 is the most reliable indicator of bias this Term
and it showed significant conservative movement. While Tables 5
and 6 show somewhat of a conservative trend, they present so little
data that they are of little value in evaluating ideological trends (a
conclusion which might also be applied to Table 7, which moved
liberally). The Court, therefore, appears to be moving in a
moderately liberal direction.
As for individual voting behavior, some of the Justices are voting
somewhat uncharacteristically. For example, factor analysis
highlights Tables 1 and 3, civil-state and criminal-state cases, as the
most indicative of bias. Those Tables, however, shake up the classic
five/four, conservative/liberal divide on the Court. Interestingly,
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer cast the majority of their votes with the
government on Table 1-the second most reliable indicator of bias
this Term-falling in with the most conservative Justices on civil-state
cases. Also, Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy in being the
determinative vote for closely decided cases.
As we noted last Term, a change in the ideological orientation of
only a single Justice, in such circumstances, can dramatically impact
the outcome across the entire range of issues examined by this Study.
APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided
by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if
accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition
are included only if they are accompanied by a full opinion of the
Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a
four-four vote resulting in affirmance without written opinion have
been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per curium opinions are
considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than
perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of these categories
are not included in the database for any of the tables. For the 2007
Term, the Supreme Court released seventy-three slip opinions. Of
these, two were per curiam decisions affirmed by an equally divided
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Court,' while six did not raise issues in any of our nine categories."
Thus, the universe of cases for the 2006 Term includes sixty-two
cases.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. 9 Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a
problem of classification. No cases in 2007 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables I through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if
governmental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these
tables if they do not satisfy this criterion90 The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or
officials9' or, with respect to a state government, one of its political
subdivisions. A suit against a government official in a personal
capacity is included if that official is represented by government
attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise clearly
implicated. 92 In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if
87. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. Of N.Y. v. Tom F., No. 06-637 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2007)
(per curiam); Warner-Lambert Co., L.L.C. v. Kent, No. 06-1498 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008) (per
curiam).
88. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, No. 06-1221 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2008); New
Jersey v. Delaware, No. 134, Orig. (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., No. 06-937 (U.S. June 9, 2008); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.
No. 07-210 (U.S. June 9, 2008); Allison Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. U.S. ex rel Sanders, No.
07-210 (U.S. June 9, 2008); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219 (U.S. June 25, 2008).
89. Note that petitions for federal habeas relief, though technically civil cases
(generally against a state warden or other prison official), are classified as criminal. See,
e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, No. 06-8273 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2008); Medellin v. Texas, No. 06-
984 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2008); Munaf v. Geren, No. 06-1666 (U.S. June 12, 2008); Boumediene
v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. June 12, 2008). Also note that actions protesting prison
conditions or treatment are classified as civil, despite involving parties incarcerated under
criminal law. The 2006 Study offers a good example of this in Erickson v. Pardus, No. 06-
7317 (U.S. June 4, 2007) (per curiam) (regarding the proper administration of prisoner's
hepatitis treatment).
90. E.g., New Jersey, No. 134, Orig. (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008).
91. E.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, No. 06-1321 (U.S. May 27, 2008). Potter is the
Postmaster General and thus is a federal party.
92. A good example of this kind of case appeared in the 2006 Study with Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (involving Fourth Amendment issues relating to a high-speed
car chase where state would likely indemnify police officer).
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United States governmental entities appear on both sides of the
controversy. 3 If both a state and a federal entity are parties to the
same suit on the same side with only private parties on the other, the
case is included on Data Tables 1 and 2.9' A case is included more
than once on the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues
affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by
different voting alignments.9
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written
opinion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A
case is also included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association and free exercise of religion are included. However,
Establishment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of
religious establishment is often made against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and other civil rights
statutes expressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color,
93. See 2006 Study, Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483 (2007) (Attorney General and
Governor of Guam on opposing sides); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Zuni
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007). However, a case is included
on Data Table 1 or Data Table 2 if a foreign sovereign opposes a U.S. government party.
E.g., Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New York, No. 06-134 (U.S. June
14, 2007). The Study's definition of conservative as voting for a U.S. government party
does not break down if that vote is against a foreign government, whereas the case is
unclassifiable if the vote is for one U.S. government entity but against another.
94. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, No. 06-340 (U.S. June
25, 2007). The Arizona Attorney General and the United States Solicitor General both
were interested parties as attorneys of record on the same side.
95. No cases in the 2007 Term resulted in multiple votes on one table.
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national origin, sex, religion, age or physical handicap.' Actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right
asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue involves the
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand. However, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted is
based on the United States Constitution and the issue relates to that
constitutional right.' The purpose of this exclusion is to preserve the
distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness,
abstention, equitable discretion,98 and justiciability. Jurisdictional
questions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by the conflicting actions of federal
and state or local governments. Common examples of these issues
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government
action, and federal court interference with state court activities (other
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal"
federalism (where the regulatory power of one state assertedly
conflicts with the regulatory interests of sister states) or interstate
relationships, such as those raised by the dormant Commerce Clause
or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, in most instances are
excluded from the table."
96. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, No. 06-1717 (U.S. June 2, 2008). The Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA) is considered a statutory civil right and is included in the
statutory civil rights category.
97. See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., No. 07-474 (U.S. June 9, 2008). While
the petitioner sued under Equal Protection, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
dissented, declaring that Engquist's claim fell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
98. E.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-43 (U.S.
Jan 15, 2008). Here the Court uses classic equitable considerations to conclude that there
is no implied right of action and if there is, it must be provided by reversal.
99. For an example of a Dormant Commerce Clause issue that did appear on a table,
see United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330 (2007). This case was included on Table 9 (Federalism) in the 2006 Study because the
Court's rejection of the Dormant Commerce Clause claim unequivocally favored state
rather than federal regulatory power.
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5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that
reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the
majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a
tie vote."° Reversals by a vote of five-two are also not included, as
four-three reversals, though disfavored, are valid.' °' A case is
included more than once in the table if it raises two or more distinct
issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are resolved
by different voting alignments. Swing votes are considered liberal or
conservative outcomes when the same voting alignment is used to
decide an issue on Tables 1-9; cases that do not appear on Tables 1-9
are not counted as liberal or conservative outcomes.1 2
APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. The following
sections explain the statistical methods employed in this Study and
how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a
Justice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments. For example, a category including ten cases
during the term will have the potential for eleven different scores
(0% through 100%, in 10% increments), while a category with only
one case during the Term will provide only two score possibilities
(0% and 100%).
100. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, No. 06-43 (U.S. Jan 15, 2008) (which is a 5-3
affirmance, not a reversal, and so is not included on Table 10); cf Bd. of Ed. of City Sch.
Dist. Of N.Y. v. Tom F., No. 06-637 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2007) (per curiam) (affirmed by an
equally divided Court of 4-4).
101. For an example of such a case, see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
102. All cases on Table 10 appeared on at least one of Tables 1-9.
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B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average ("ARIMA") forecasting model. 3 This model is
useful in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a
Justice's score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior
values with no other explanatory variables. ARIMA is an acronym
for Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average. The model is most
easily explained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated:
Auto-Regression:
This term refers to a differencing process
which operates in a manner similar to
differentiation of a continuous function in
calculus. The goal is simply to remove trend
from the time series data by subtracting each
score in the time series from the next score in
the series. The resulting differences form a
new time series. This operation may be
repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs
only one differencing operation.
Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be
determined. " This parameter seeks to relate
each data point in the stationary series to the
data point immediately preceding it through
multiplication. That is:
X, = AX,.1
where X, is the value of the data series at point
t, A is the autoregressive parameter, and Y,., is
the value of the data series point immediately
preceding X,.
103. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics 248-49 (1992).
104. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and
MA models.
[Vol. 37:2
Winter 2010] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 2007 TERM 335
Because we are dealing with a series of data
points, however, a single parameter will almost
never precisely produce the relationship just
described for all data point pairs. Some error
is inevitable. We therefore seek to determine
that parameter which produces the least total
error when applied to the entire series.'
Moving Average: A second parameter is determined that relates
the value of each series element X, to the error
between the estimated value and the actual
value of the previous element X,-1. That is:
X, = -Bx,.,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter.
The value of this parameter is also optimized
to minimize its total error when applied to the
series.
Synthesis: The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Ax,_1-Bx,-,+ E,
where E, represents the residual error
remaining between the calculated and actual
values of X,. This final equation is used to
predict the series score for the upcoming
Term.O0
105. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
106. In the 2006 Term, our prediction for Justice Breyer on Table 2 was off by 43
points. After inspecting a graph of the actual data series (see Figure xx), one might
wonder how our predictive model could have gone so wrong.
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Figure xx
However, if we remove the actual 2006 score (which was unknown and therefore not
available as input to the model), and if we add the complete set of scores predicted by the
model (see Figure xy), things look a little better.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Figure xy
The dotted line in the graph shows the ARIMA estimates for each point based on best fit
(least error) values for p, 0, and 0 (see Appendix A, Part B. Predictive Modeling). The
model does a pretty good job of tracing the actual data-up to the 2006 estimate as shown
Justice Breyer-Chart 2
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C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"' ' to determine whether this Term's
score (X), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X,). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.'" We hypothesize that X, is also
the true mean of the population V, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
in the figure. The last estimate, however, does not seem so unreasonable if one considers
that Justice Breyer's actual 2006 score is visually rather an "outlier" in the context of the
five scores immediately preceding it which trend upward toward our 2006 estimate. Also,
ARIMA's more visually satisfying prediction for 2007 helps to bolster confidence in the
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Figure xz
Attempting to predict the Justices' scores is an ambitious undertaking, but the authors
enjoy trying.
107. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see David S. Moore & George P.
McCabe, Introduction to the Practice of Statistics 500-18 (1993). See also Craig and Hogg,
supra note 33.
108. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
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Ho: = , The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not
significantly shift V from its previous value on
the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are statistically equivalent.
Ha: p- X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X significantly
shifts p from its previous value on the real
number line. Therefore, the two samples are
not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a
certain confidence interval, °9 by rejecting the null hypothesis." ° This
is accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
X2 -,Ut-
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired .0
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k)."' If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, H is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921)
between the voting percentages of the former Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia for the Equal Protection category. The points all
fall close to an upward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2
shows that the voting percentages of the Justice Scalia and Justice
109. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
X2 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction), = .025.
110. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is
beyond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha)
error. For a complete explanation, see Moore and McCabe, supra note 131.
111. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized
parameter, so k = 1.
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Stevens show only a very weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473).
The points are widely scattered about a downward sloping line.
Statistically significant correlations between and among Justices'
Term-to Term voting percentages are shown in Regression Tables 1-
10. The first number in each pair is the Pearson correlation
coefficient. The second number is an r' statistic, which is a more
reliable measure of the actual level of correlation.'
12
Equal Protection Cases .... + .4 1
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Figure 2
112. The r2 statistic is an estimate of 02, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the
tables is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
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The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two
Justices does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It
simply means that their scores tend to move up and down together
from one Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way
implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using
batteries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that
validly measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly
attempts to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by
"testing" their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by
extracting a single factor, using principal components analysis and
applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description of the
theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond the
scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject are available
that provide reasonably simple explanations of this complex
process."3
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an
example. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of







Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet
player because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while
Debbie would argue that the best marbles player should win because
113. See generally Dennis Child, The Essentials of Factor Analysis (2d ed. 1990).
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each has scored highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty
would argue that each sport should receive equal weight, because her
combined score with equal weightings would be higher than either
Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7,
while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score
4.5, and Debbie would score 5.5. The following figure plots the
athlete's scores graphically:








A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
points A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary
beyond which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative
weights assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at
100% of the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to
the extent her point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two
points adjacent to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient
to the extent they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the
points at which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the
frontier regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet.
However, an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C
"looks his best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However,
instead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis
includes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We
performed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature.
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Although the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward,
a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this appendix.
'Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1
(1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997 Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533
(1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000) [hereinafter 1998
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1999 Term, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (2001) [hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000 Term, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247
(2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 2001 Term, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (2003) [hereinafter 2001
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2002 Term, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 499 (2004) [hereinafter 2002 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2003 Term, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 769
(2005) [hereinafter 2003 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 2004 Term, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909 (2005) [hereinafter 2004
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2005 Term, 34
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 505 (2007) [hereinafter 2005 Study]. Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2006 Term, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 51
(2008) [hereinafter 2006 Study].
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